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1 Introduction
There are serious theoretical reasons for the existence of non-market interventions in
the pharmaceutical industry. The presence of substantial R&D and marketing (sunk)
costs creates large barriers to entry, which limits the positive effects of competition. In
addition, the consumer is typically insured, so she does not pay the full cost of the
medicine. Furthermore, consumption often requires a prescription, and the prescribing
physician is, in most cases, insulated from the economic aspects of the decision. This
situation creates severe informational and incentive problems, which make some kind of
government regulation (or insurance company control) potentially beneficial in theory.
Indeed, Ballance et al. (1992) survey 56 nations and find that most countries impose
some form of price controls. But the amount of regulation varies a great deal across
countries, as they go from “substantial,” to “limited,” to “nonexistent.” Even the form
of regulation can be heterogeneous. As Scherer (2000) notes, the instruments can be:
reference pricing, product per product negotiation, price caps, rate of return regulation
and formula pricing.
The existence of theoretical reasons for price intervention does not imply that actual
regulation is necessarily efficient. It may also exist to transfer rents from some groups of
economic agents to others. A firm, which spends vast amounts of money to develop a new
drug, necessarily has to expect large operating profits, after the discovery has been made.
But at that time, it may be in the (short-term) interest of a government to impose low
prices for the product in order to receive the goodwill of the consumers/voters. In addition,
of course, the prices of pharmaceuticals depend on other economic factors, such as the
usefulness of the products or the market power of the producers, in different degrees. Thus,
the question of what determines actual regulation, rent-seeking or economic efficiency,
deserves an empirical investigation.
In spite of this interest, there has been no systematic empirical study of the determi-
nants of pricing in this industry for a large set of products and countries.1 In this paper
we attempt to fill this vacuum. We study pricing in pharmaceuticals using a multicoun-
try and multiproduct data set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the period
1998-2003. Our dataset encompasses a large number of countries including the top ten in
terms of pharmaceutical expenditures, as well as other countries that are either smaller in
size or with a lower income. The data comprises products from a large number of groups
or anatomic classifications. The richness of the data allow us to study the determinant
1The existing studies mostly look at small groups of chemicals for a few countries (Lu and Comanor
1998, Danzon and Chao 2000a, 2000b Ekelund and Persson 2003).
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of price variation between countries, and we give special attention to both regulatory
regimes and industrial structure.
Literature The work of Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b) is specially relevant for
our purposes within the large literature on this topic. They study the effect of regulatory
regimes on price setting. Their data includes seven big countries in terms of spending
which are classified in terms of the severity of regulation.2 Danzon and Chao (2000a)
estimate a reduced form equation where prices depend on quality attributes of the prod-
uct and on the competition characteristics of the market. Their empirical results suggest
that regulation limits the beneficial effect of competition. Using similar data, Danzon
and Chao (2000b) demonstrate that the conventional view that drug prices are much
higher in the US than in other countries is incorrect. The biased perception is due to the
small, unrepresentative samples and to the inappropriate methods used in prior studies.
In this paper we further confirm and amplify this view by showing, with a much larger
database and a robust empirical strategy, that the U.S. prices are indeed in line with
those of countries of similar income levels. In a similar vein, a study by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (2004) has argued that the lower (income-adjusted) prices induced by
regulation in the OECD countries, with respect to the U.S., hurts consumers in the long
term through the lower incentive for R&D and thus through lower discovery of life-saving
drugs. Domı´nguez, Ganuza and Llobet (2006) provide a theoretical counterargument.
Price controls hurt small (“me-too”) innovations more than the relatively price inelastic
drastic innovations, and could even induce larger investment by focusing firms on the
drastic innovations. We have a more fundamental challenge to the U.S. Department of
Commerce (2004) results, since our more carefully income-adjusted prices do not show
2From more to less regulated, the first group includes Italy, France and Japan were launch prices are
regulated and afterward are revised downwards over the drug’s life cycle. The price of new varieties is
related to the price of established varieties. In addition, consumer and physicians demand are expected
to be inelastic due to insurance coverage, and generics substitution by pharmacists was not allowed in
France and Italy at the time of the study. Moreover, pharmacies are paid a margin on the product price
which may encourage the sale of more expensive products. The second group includes UK and Germany
were corporations are free to set prices at launch but prices cannot increase (freely) later on. In addition,
in both countries there is some type of upper bound to prices, implemented either through a reference
price (Germany) or a maximum overall rate of return (UK). Generics substitution by pharmacists is the
main source of price-demand elasticity, since they keep the margin between the reimbursement price and
the manufacturers price. This is possible in UK, and to a lesser extent in Germany. The third group
includes US and Canada where prices are free, consumers’ and physicians’ demands appear to be less
inelastic and generic substitution on the side of the pharmacists is encouraged as a means to promote
competition.
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that U.S. prices are indeed lower, in line with the results of Danzon and Chao for a smaller
database.
Kyle (2007) examines the effect of price controls in the extent and timing of the
launch of new drugs around the world and finds that regulation has a statistically and
quantitatively important effect on pharmaceutical launches. The effect takes two forms.
First, drugs invented by firms headquartered in countries that use price controls reach
fewer markets and with longer delays than products that originate in countries without
price controls. Second, companies delay launch into price-controlled markets, and are less
likely to introduce their products in additional markets after entering a country with low
prices. Launches into low price countries in Europe are further delayed after a regulatory
change allowing parallel imports, which could potentially depress prices in high price
markets. The findings of Kyle (2007) support our theoretical explanation for our own
finding that the effect of the nationality of the producers on prices is negligible. We argue
theoretically that the fear of reducing prices in markets with high prices leads producers
to a strategically credible resistance to price reduction in more regulated countries.
In terms of empirical specification, previous evidence in this industry suggest that
marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry and recommend the use of a hedonic
price approach. For example, Berndt et al (1999) estimate a hedonic price equation that
measures the price impact of drug attributes. Likewise, we do not attempt to estimate
marginal cost effects on prices.
The effect of entry of generic products on price evolution has attracted recently a lot of
attention. The empirical evidence on this issue is ambiguous. Some authors (Grabowski
and Vernon, 1992 and 1997, and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 1991) report that brand-
name prices increased after the entry of generic competition, while others (Wiggins and
Maness, 1994) find a reduction in brand-name prices following entry. Finally, Frank and
Salkever (1992 and 1997) report that brand name prices increased while generic products
prices fell, producing a reduction in average prices. Our analysis shows that generics
prices are indeed lower than those of brand name products, and we also show (see section
5.3), that the impact of the number of competitors depends on the therapeutical class
analyzed (thus explaining the diverging results of earlier literature).
Empirical strategy and results Our empirical strategy introduces several inno-
vations with respect to the previous empirical literature in the subject.
1. We estimate pricing equations separately for each country, and then we obtain
estimates by pooling the countries. By pooling the sample we will be able to explore
the interplay of cross-national variables and regulation in price setting. For example,
4
by including as an explanatory variable the GDP per capita, or the ratio of public
consumption to GDP, we can assess, in a very disaggregate context, whether higher
prices are observed primarily in richer countries or in countries with larger public
sectors.3
2. We exploit the panel nature of the data and control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the product level. By doing so, we control for time invariant factors that affect
price setting. In particular we control for “unobserved” marginal effects. However,
this comes at a cost, since this reduces notably the variation of the data. In this
context, we identify the effect of time-invariant variables by following a two-stage
procedure.
3. With the exception of products without consumption or information in a given
period, we do not restrict the sample in any way. However, we do explore the
sensitivity of our results to the restriction of the sample in several dimensions:
(a) The restriction to single molecule products, which has been explored in other
studies.4
(b) The variation of the sample to the number of countries where a corporation is
present.
(c) The variation of the sample to the number of countries a molecule is present.
(d) The analysis by therapeutical category.
By exploring these dimensions we are able to assess the robustness of the results to
the restriction of the sample, as well as the effects of increasing the “internationality”
of the corporationsor the ”brandedness” of the products analyzed and the “diffusion”
of molecules.
Our results show that variables related to the quality of the product are strongly
significant in explaining the prices. For example, older products are less expensive, and
recently approved ones command a price premium. This is reassuring, as it represent a
check that pricing has an element of rationality, but possibly it is not very surprising.
There is also robust evidence in the data that market forces operate in the expected
3Danzon and Furukawa (2003) suggest theoretically that fixed costs should be distributed across
countries depending on demand elasticities, so that higher prices should be observed in richer countries.
This suggests that in a multi-country study, like ours, variables with cross-country variation should be
included in the regression.
4For example, Danzon and Chao (2000a).
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way. This can be seen in the fact in that larger firms (measured in different ways) tend
to command higher prices, although not strongly in quantitative terms. Also, generic
products, which operate in off-patent markets (thus, probably more competitive ones)
have lower prices.
Another sensible finding is that higher per-capita income produces higher prices in
any given country, most likely derived from a lower price elasticity, confirming Danzon
and Furukawa (2003) theoretical observation.5 There is also a positive effect on prices of
a higher ratio of public consumption to GDP. The interpretation of this finding is less
straightforward. Most likely, a higher public consumption to GDP also signals a low
price elasticity, relative to countries with the same income, probably derived from higher
insulation of consumers from prices through national health insurance. However, the size
of this effect depends on the level of regulation, and it is larger for less regulated countries.
To understand the impact of regulation we classified the countries in our sample in
three groups, from less to more regulated.6 We observe that the country fixed effect of
more regulated countries tends, indeed, to be lower than that of the rest, although this
is far from universal. For example, the fixed effect of the U.S.A. is significantly higher
than that, of Canada (but not for all specifications), France or Italy. This means that if
average prices in the U.S.A. are higher it is not because other countries engage in “free
riding regulation,” but because its per-capita income is higher.
Let us elaborate a bit more systematically on the price variation across countries, since
this is one the main contributions of this paper. We can summarize our findings in this
respect in four points.
1. There are not very large differences in prices within the group of low regulated
countries (among which the U.S. is the largest market).
2. There are large and systematic differences in prices between the group of low regu-
lated countries and a group of more highly regulated ones.
3. The price differences increase when the product is distributed by truly global com-
panies that are present in all the countries of our sample.
4. The price differences decrease when the molecule is present in all the countries of
our sample.
5“the global joint costs should be recouped through price markups over marginal cost that differ based
on income levels, assuming that income is a major determinant of “true” price elasticity. Thus, price
differentials that are related to income would be consistent with both economic efficiency and equity.”
Danzon and Furukawa (2003, p. 534).
6See section 4 for an explanation of the classification method.
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Our interpretation for these results is that regulation is effective in bringing prices
down, but specially so in the more innovative products, those that are produced and
distributed by global companies around the world. On the other hand, for products
that are common, in the sense of produced in all countries, but not by global companies
(typically more advanced in their life cycles), the effect of regulation is vanishing or even
reversed. This suggests that competition is at least as effective as regulation in bringing
prices down, when applicable.
Another interesting result of the paper concerning regulation is that foreign multina-
tional companies do not experience noticeably different prices from local multinationals,
even in relatively highly regulated countries. This suggests that even though one would
expect governments to regulate more leniently their own firms, the multinationals are
somehow protected. Perhaps a reason for this is that conceding a low price in one country
would entail, through reference pricing, lower prices in many others. Reference pricing
would act, thus, as the sort of best-price guarantee which has been criticized in the anti-
trust literature (see Motta 1998, chapter XX).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first present in section 2 a model
which accounts for the empirical findings we discuss in later sections. Then, in section
3, we present the empirical strategy. Section 4 explains the data and the construction of
the variables employed. Section 5 presents the main results from the analysis. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We assume demand for a pharmaceutical product to be iso-elastic, so as to estimate a
log-linear specification. In other words, we can write it:
Q = exp[A(P c, v, S)]p−βQ
implying
lnQ = A(P c, v, S)− β ln pQ.
The function A(P c, v, s) subsumes all the factors affecting demand which do not come
from the own price of the good. The main ones, as the notation makes clear, and which
we use in the estimation, come from direct or indirect substitutes (P c), the quality of the
product (v, innovativeness, perceived quality) or size of the market (S).
We have stressed in the introduction one aspect of the pricing problem which we
think is of paramount importance. Namely, we are interested in how the price varies
across countries. There are strategic complications that arise from the fact that in this
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market, the usual competitive assumptions tend to be wrong. Some government regulate
heavily the prices of pharmaceutical, and others do not. Even the countries who do not
regulate markets are affected by others’ regulations, as current media controversies in the
U.S. regarding prices abroad reflect. This implies that the national differences in price
behavior could be large, as we will see in the estimation, and may come from unexpected
sources. In order to clarify some of the issues at stake, let us present a simplified political
economy model that captures some interesting facets of the problem.
Assume that a pharmaceutical company sells monopolistically in two countries a prod-
uct which it produces at constant marginal cost c (the monopoly may occur because it
holds a valid patent). Demands at the Home (H) and Foreign (F ) countries are log-linear
(as in the model we estimate):
lnQH = AH − b ln pH ; lnQF = AF − b ln pF
The prices are determined through a game, which is intended to capture an important
fact of real-life markets. Namely, many of the producing countries are large, rich, or both
(the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland). Many of the countries doing strict price regulation
have negligible industries.
More formally, let the government of the H country pursue a price-control policy. It
unilaterally sets the maximum price at which the company can sell the product in country
H, pH . The firm can choose between selling in that country, in which case it must choose
a price pH ≤ pH or not to sell the good at all. In the F country the regulation is of the
reference price type, that is, pF ≤ pH . With isoelastic prices, the monopolistic price is
equal in both countries. This means that the reference price constraint is always binding,
and pF = pH provided the good is sold in both countries and that the price set in F is
lower than its monopoly price.7
If the company has headquarters in the H country, the regulator sets the price to
maximize consumer surplus at H, plus firms profits. Since the prices set in this way are
never higher than those preferred by the monopolist, the price constraint of the govern-
ment will always be binding. Thus, the price in country H is completely determined by
the regulator, by solving the following program:
max
p
AH
p1−β
β − 1 +
(
AHp
−β + AFp−β
)
(p− c)
subject to
(
AHp
−β + AFp−β
)
(p− c) ≥ pi∗F
7An alternative modeling choice, with similar implications, would be to think that pharmaceutical
imports are legal, and then arbitrage would force a single price in both countries.
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where pi∗F is the monopoly profit of selling only at F, in which case it is sold at monopoly
prices, and is given by
pi∗F = AF
(
βc
β − 1
)−β (
βc
β − 1 − c
)
. We solve the problem both with and without the constraint and then show when is
the constraint binding at the optimum. The price p that solves the problem without the
constraint is
p∗ =
β (AF + AH) c
(β − 1) (AF + AH) + AH
The price p∗ satisfies the constraint if:
(AH + AF )
(
β (AF + AH) c
(β − 1) (AF + AH) + AH
)−β (
β (AF + AH) c
(β − 1) (AF + AH) + AH − c
)
≥
AF
(
βc
β − 1
)−β (
βc
β − 1 − c
)
(1)
Denote by λ = AF/ (AH + AF ) , then we can rewrite equation (1):(
βc
(β − 1) + λ
)−β (
βc
(β − 1) + λ − c
)
≥ λ
(
βc
β − 1
)−β (
βc
β − 1 − c
)
(
1
(β − 1) + λ
)−β (
β
(β − 1) + λ − 1
)
≥ λ
(
1
β − 1
)−β (
β
β − 1 − 1
)
(
(β − 1) + λ
β − 1
)β−1
≥ λ
1− λ
Thus, when λ is significantly smaller from one, this can be achieved. This is reasonable
when H is a sufficiently larger/richer country.
On the other hand, if the company has headquarters at F, the regulator sets prices so
that consumer surplus is maximized, and thus, it sets the minimum price consistent with
the firm selling in H. Thus, the problem with the firm headquartered at F is:
max
p
AH
p1−β
β − 1
subject to
(
AHp
−β + AFp−β
)
(p− c) ≥ pi∗F
Notice that this program is such that the objective of the regulator is to set the minimal
price consistent with the constraint, call it pc
Put simply, we have a model that predicts that the price set by the regulator is weakly
higher for the local multinational than for the foreign one. But as λ grows it reaches a
point when the constraint becomes binding. This means that as the size of F grows
with respect to H the price of the foreign multinational converges to that of the local
multinational. Thus, suppose that countries which are more heavy regulators in practice
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are relatively small in size (as compared to less regulated countries). This would imply
that they cannot influence substantially the prices in favor of the local multinationals. Or
at least, they cannot influence prices enough for this to show in a relevant relationship in
the data. As we will see, this is indeed the case in our data.
3 Econometric specification
In the previous section we have shown that the equilibrium price for product i of firm f
in market k and country j, p
′
ifkj, can be represented as a function of competitors’ pricing
strategies, quality variables and other factors, summarized in the function A∗ifkj. Taking
this into account, we consider the following log-linear specification:
log(p
′
ifkjt) = α + A
∗
ifkjt + vifkjt
where t denotes time, and v denotes an error term, and α is a parameter. We further
consider that
A∗ifkjt = X
′
ifkjtβ + Z
′
ijγ + ηr + ηj + dt
where X and Z are vectors of respectively time-variant and time-invariant variables
that potentially affect equilibrium prices, and β and γ are the corresponding vectors
of parameters. The term ηr represents a specific effect, where r is (depending on the
specification) either i, f, or, k; ηj is a country specific effect, and dt is a time specific
factor. After replacing these expressions in the above equation we obtain:
log(p
′
ifkjt) = α+X
′
ifkjtβ + Z
′
iγ + ηr ++ηj + dt + vifkjt (2)
Note that when r = i, both the effect of Zij and ηj are absorbed by the individual
effects and, consequently, they are not directly identifiable.8 Since we have a genuine
interest in some time-invariant factors, we follow a two-stage procedure to estimate them
(Mundlak, 1978): we first estimate the above 1st stage equation and obtain an estimate
of ηi, say ηˆi, and then, in a second stage, we regress ηˆi against the time invariant factors.
That is we estimate the 2nd stage equation:
ηˆi = Z
′
iγ + ηf + ηk + ηj + ui (3)
where ui is an error term and ηk, ηf , and ηj control for market (or molecule), firm and
country specific effects, respectively. Depending on the exact assumption about them,
8Note also that ηj is also not identifiable when the sample is restricted to a single country.
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we follow one estimation strategy or another. For example, in case we assume they
are random and uncorrelated with the variables in Z, then an LS estimate of the above
equation identifies the parameters of the model. Alternatively, we can follow a conditional
approach and use an LSDV estimator controlling either ηk, ηf or ηj or all three terms
altogether. We shall explore some of these possibilities in data.
An alternative strategy to identify the effect of the Z variables is to assume that the
product specific effects (ηi) are well represented by the combination of market effects, say
ηk (or, alternatively corporation effects, say ηf ) and the Z
′
ijγ component. Note that, in
this particular case, the effect of the variables in Z can be identified in just one step.
We carry the analysis at two levels: country by country (25 countries) and pooling the
data for all the countries. Note that in the latter case the country specific effects are fully
identifiable. Since the number of markets and number of product varies across countries,
we check the robustness of the results to the variation in two complementary dimensions:
the number of countries in which the corporation to which the product belongs is present
(for example: 1+, 10+, 20+, 25), and the number of countries in which a given molecule
is present (for example: 1+, 10+, 20+, 25). We also present results when restricting the
sample to single molecules, and when restricting it to products for which the molecule
and the corporation is present in all the countries of the sample.
Regarding the estimation methods, we estimate equations (2 and 3) using a Within
Groups panel data method. In the first stage, we control for time-invariant heterogeneity
across product, while in the second we control for this heterogeneity across molecules. In
order to avoid potential endogeneity problems of some variables, we follow an IV approach
and lag all the time-varying (potentially endogenous) covariates in the model.
4 Data, construction of the variables and specifica-
tion
We use a multi-country and multi-product data set from the IMS MIDAS international
database for the period 1998-20039. This dataset encompasses a large number of countries
including the top ten in terms of expenditure, as well as medium size and small countries
(see Table 2 for a list of countries and summary statistics). It also includes a large
number of groups or anatomic classifications, and allows to study the price variation
across countries which differ in terms of both regulatory regimes and industrial structure.
Many corporations supply drugs in several of these markets that can be defined at different
9Our data includes information from the 4th quarter of each year, except for 2003, for which the
information is provided for the 2nd quarter.
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levels of disaggregation. In the current study we regard the 4-digit Anatomic therapeutical
classification (ATC4) as a market, but it would be desirable to contrast our results using
alternative levels of disaggregation.10 Table 3 presents the distribution of corporations
depending on the number of markets supplied, and Table 4 presents the distribution of
molecule ages by countries.
4.1 Variables and first stage and second stage specifications
The dependent variable in our analysis , called Price, corresponds to sales revenue divided
by the number of ‘standard units’ sold. Accordingly, when several formulations of the
product co-exist in the market, this corresponds to a weighted average of the price per
standard unit of all these alternative formulations. Nominal country specific quantities
are converted to 2000 US $.
Marginal costs are almost irrelevant in this industry.11 Accordingly, in our regression
we use a hedonic approach and include quality and competition variables (see section A.1
of the appendix for a list of variables with definitions) to proxy the equilibrium price.
Our controls can be classified in one of two categories: time-variant and time-invariant
controls.
Our list of time variant controls or first stage controls includes: the firm’s size in terms
of sales in the country, Fsales, which is constructed as total corporation sales (excluding
sales of the product under analysis) in each country. Firm’s size is included in log form
in order to give more weight two differences in small values than in large values and it
is lagged one period in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The average global price of
the molecule (excluding the product under consideration) or Globalprice. The variable #
generics represents the number of generic products in each market and country. New is
a dummy variable equal to one if the product was launched in the previous year and zero
otherwise.
Among the competition variables we include the Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration
index of the local firms (excluding the firm the product belongs to), HHI. We also include
the market share of the corporation in the market, Mshare, and its square, since we would
expect that a higher market share lead to higher prices. In order to capture differential
effects between local and foreign firms we interact these variables with the local and local
10The ATC code was not provided in the original data supplied from IMS. Fortunately we obtained an
additional sample from IMS Spain which helped us to recover the ATC for the rest of the countries. We
managed to match practically all the records in sample.
11See, e.g. Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches, 1996, Suslow, 1996, Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay, 1999,
and Cockburn and Anis, 2001.
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multinational dummies (to be defined later). Again both variables could be regarded as
endogenous and we lag them one period. Finally, we construct two other share variables:
the market share of all the national products in the market, Natshare, and the Berry
index which measures the ”importance” or degree of specialization of the corporation in
the product considered.
Our list of time invariant controls starts with the Fquota, defined as the average firm
quota in the country. Singlemol takes a value of one, if the product consists of a single
molecule, and zero otherwise. Molecule age, Molage, is the time elapsed since the molecule
was launched to December 31, 2003. The age distribution of molecules and products is
presented in Table 4. We also include to Censormol, which equals 1 if the product was
launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise; Censorlag, which equals one for
products launched before January 1, 1991 and one otherwise. We also include Summol
which counts the number of countries a given molecule is present. Therefore it can be
interpreted as a proxy of diffusion of a molecule. We finally construct dummies controlling
the type of firm: local, local-multinational and multinational, for respectively local-non
multinational, local-multinational and non-local multinational firms. They are interacted
with Fquota, Mshare as well as New.
Following Danzon and Furukawa (2003) suggestions, in the time variant pooled coun-
tries specification we control for differences between the countries with two variables: FPC
or fraction of public consumption in GDP, and GDPPCUSD or GDP per capita in 2000
US $. Both of them are interacted with a set of regulatory dummies. We consider three
levels of regulation (low, medium and high, respectively):12 (I) Australia, Czech Repub-
lic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US; (II) Austria, Belgium, France, Japan, Greece,
Portugal, Spain; (III) Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Italy, Portugal.13
For the regression analysis we use log transformations of Price, Fsales, Globalprice
Molage, and Summol so we value more the differences in smaller than in larger values. In
order to avoid potential simultaneity bias all the regressors are lagged one period except
for those related to the age of the product, which by nature are predetermined (specially
once we control for New).
12See Table 2 for summary statistics for all the countries. The classification was done by sending the list
of countries to three experts in health and pharmaceutical economics, prior to the statistical analysis of
our data. We asked them for a classification of countries in the list in three groups. In the very few cases
where the classification was not unanimous (no country was ever placed in three different categories), we
ranked it according to the majority view.
13Note that our classification, for the top countries, in terms of expending, is similar to that employed
in Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b).
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5 Results and interpretation
In this section we present the results from the empirical analysis. We begin with a review
of the country-by-country results and continue with the pooled results (for all products
as well divided by anatomic therapeutical group).
5.1 Country by country results
In tables 5 to 7 we present the country-by-country results of the first (top panel in each
table) and second stage (bottom panel) regressions for all the countries in sample. In all
the first stage regressions we use a IV-FE estimator, and a standard LS estimator in all
the second stage regressions. Likewise, in all cases we present results with the complete
sample of products. [Detailed results with restricted subsamples –by either restricting the
number of countries a given corporation (C dimension), or a given molecule (M dimension),
is present– are available upon request.]
After controlling for product (and time) fixed effects, the explanatory power of time
varying variables is very limited in practically all the countries, evidencing very little
time-series variation in the data. Despite so, we still are able to identify some regularities
across countries.
• Key findings in first stage country-specific regressions:
1. Both the market share of national products in the market the product belongs
to, the concentration of local products, and the Berry index seem to have little
effect on prices.
2. New products get a small premium in a number of countries. The largest
premium is observed for the US (whose results are reported in the last column
of table 7). The nationality of the product does not command a significant
change on the premium for novel products with two notable exceptions: the
case of Italy in which new products from exclusively local producers get an
extra premium and Canada where new product from local multinationals also
get an important premium.
3. Other things equal, the effect of firm size in prices is either non-significant or
negative but small. The largest effects are found in Denmark and the US.
4. The number of generics in the molecule, significantly reduces the level of prices
in a large number of countries. In this case the larger effect are found in Italy
and Japan. For the US the effect of the number of generics is insignificant.
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5. Global prices have very little independent effect, with the notable exceptions
of Germany, Spain and the US.
• Key findings in second stage country-specific regressions:
1. Other things equal, products from exclusively local corporations have lower
prices in practically all the countries. The effect of being local multinational
is less clear, since in a number of countries the effect is either insignificant
or negative. Non-significant coefficients imply that local and foreign multi-
national are treated equally. This is the case of the US or Canada, among
other countries. In fact, with the exception of France, in all countries with a
significant pharmaceutical industry, both local and foreign multinational are
treated equally. Apart of this, in a number of countries we find a significantly
negative coefficient (France, Italy, and Sweden among other countries). How-
ever, in practically all cases the implicit coefficient lays in between of those
for exclusively local corporations and foreign multinational firms. Thus large
multinational conglomerates seem to receive a premium over small, local, pro-
ducers.
2. With the exception of Poland, the effect of single molecule is either non-
significant or positive, specially in big pharmaceutical markets (notably Canada,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK and the US).
3. In a large majority of countries the coefficient of the generic variable is signif-
icantly negative, with the notable exception of Canada. The largest negative
effects are observed in Belgium, France, Norway, Hungary and the UK.
4. Finally, our proxy for diffusion of a molecule, summol, affects positively product
prices in a large number of countries (Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech
Rep., Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, UK and the US.
Let us now turn to pooled results, which are expected to be very informative since the
variation in data augments drastically.
5.2 Pooled Results
In tables 8 and 9 we respectively present the result of the first and second stage regressions
when pooling the information of all countries in sample. In both tables columns (1) and
(2) present respectively the all-products and single molecule first stage and second stage
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results. The rest of the columns in the aforementioned tables present the results when
varying the number of countries a corporation is present (dimension C) and the number of
countries the molecule is present (dimension M).14 The exploration of the results in these
two dimensions will help us to, firstly, check the sensitivity of the results to the sample
employed, and, secondly, to better understand the underlining common characteristics of
the problem. As in the previous section, in all the first stage regression, we use a IV-FE
estimator (with product fixed effects) with clustered standard errors. Alternatively, in all
the second stage regression we use a LS-FE estimator (with molecule fixed effect).
We obtain a number of interesting results in the first stage regressions.
1. Neither the share of local product or the degree of concentration affect strongly (in
a quantitative sense) the prices. In fact the effect of the share of local product is
even negative when we restrict the sample to products of corporation presents in
many countries. Regardless of the dimension explored, the effect of the firm size
is significantly negative, but small. The degree of specialization of the corporation
seems to have a positive effect on prices as we move along the C dimension, but this
is not confirmed when we move in the M dimension. Apart from this, the number
of generics does not seem to have any systematic effect on prices.
2. As expected, new products get a premium which increases in the two dimensions
explored. Interestingly, we find that new product launches on the part of local
innovative firms receive a larger premium than other types of (multinational) firms.
As we shall illustrate in the next section (see table 10) the finding is robust to the
analysis by therapeutical class.
3. The effect of the global price is always positive and significant. The effect decreases
when the number of countries the corporation is present increases and increases
with the diffusion of the molecule. It is also interesting to note that the absence of
a global price (or global reference, which means the product is innovative) increases
significantly the price (above 1/3 if we move in the C dimension, and above 1/2 if
we move in the molecule dimension).
4. Finally, the pooling strategy allows us to identify the effect of some aggregate vari-
ables, such us the fraction of public consumption in the GDP and the per capita
GDP. After preliminary exploration of the date we interacted both variables with
14We present results when the sample is restricted to products which belong to corporation or molecules
present in 1+ (all sample), 10+ or 25 countries. Results for other restricted samples are in line with the
ones presented here and are available upon request.
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the level of regulation (from 1, low, to 3, high). For low regulated countries (REG1),
the effect of both variables is positive and significant and increases in the two di-
mensions studied. In particular, other things equal, an increase of one percentage
basis points in the fraction of public consumption in the GDP translates into a 1.2
and 2.0 percent increase in the price, depending on the specification. Note that the
elasticity increases as we move in the C dimension and reduces with the M dimen-
sion. Likewise, the price elasticity of the GDP per capita is very high, between 2.0
and 0.8 depending on the specification. In contrast with the result for the fraction of
public consumption, the price elasticity of the GDP per capita reduces as we move
in either the C or the M dimension. In medium and high regulated countries the
effect of the fraction of public consumption in the GDP gets reduced significantly,
except for those molecule that are present in all the countries. Alternatively, the
effect of the GPD is significantly higher for both types of countries.
We now turn our attention to second stage regressions results.
1. Being a product from a exclusively-local corporation clearly reduces the price by
approximately 15 per cent regardless of the dimension studied.
2. Alternatively, being a product from a local multinational has no clear effect on prices
except for those product in which the corporation and the molecule is present in
all countries (last column of Table 9). In this particular case the effect is sizeable
and negative. Thus, in general local and international multinational corporations
are treated equally.
3. We find that on average the price for generic products is between -0.15 and -0.20
percent lower than other prices. Again, the effect is larger when the sample is
restricted to products of corporation and molecules present in all countries.
The analysis of country fixed effects, as reported in Table 9 and Figure 1 for selected
cases, gives us a very interesting picture of the role of the regulation. First of all, price
in developing countries (with the exception, in some cases, of Egypt) or very regulated
(European) countries are lower than in less regulated countries, particularly lower than
in the US. As we move to a more homogeneous sample in the C dimension the price gap
is more evident. Alternatively, when we move in the M dimension (varying the number
of countries a given molecule is present), the effect is less evident, even non-significant in
some cases. The differences are more evident when we look to the last column of Table
9 (were the sample is restricted to products of corporations and molecules present in all
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countries, see also Figure 1 and Table 5.2 for a summary of differences): the average
country effect for the very regulated countries is -4.80, for the regulated ones -3.20 and
for the low regulated countries -0.435.
Within the group of less regulated countries (which includes the Northern, Eastern
and some Central European countries plus Australia, Canada and the US) we can also
document several interesting findings. Firstly, in the overall sample (or the sample of
single molecules) there is little evidence than average prices are higher in the US than in
other countries (particularly the Eastern European ones, but also other countries), since
we find a number of cases for which the country fixed effect is positive. Note that this
finding is in accordance with the results in Danzon and Chao (2000b) but obtained in a
much more general sample both in terms of products and countries considered. Secondly,
as we move in the C dimension, all the country specific effects decrease, that is, those
positive are closer to zero or change sign to negative (this is the case of Canada, Germany,
Switzerland and UK) and those negative turn out more negative, but the average differ-
ences with respect to the US level increase. Thirdly, when we move in the M dimension,
the differences between countries decrease but not by a large amount. Thus, the US have a
relatively lower price (compared to other developed countries) for products manufactured
by multinationals, and a higher price with products that are “very common” (probably at
a later stage in their life cycle). This is consistent with the explanation that the U.S., with
her insistence in competition rather than regulation to contain prices, does well for goods
where there can be competition (mostly off-patent not quite innovative goods). On the
other hand, the other (mostly European) developed countries are successful at capping
the prices of patented innovative goods, whereas they are less able to contain prices for
products where competition could do a good job at restraining prices in the absence of
regulation.
To finalize we would like to stress to cases: Canada and that of the Nordic countries.
In the case of Canada, we do not detect any differences in average price level in the overall
sample. As we restrict the sample to products from multinational (most likely branded)
some differences in favor of the US appear, that is prices in the US case are higher. On
the contrary, as we move in the diffusion dimension, price in the Canada turn out to be
higher. The case of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, which
are classified in the group of ”low” regulated countries), whose associated coefficients all
over Table 9 are significantly more negative than the rest of the coefficients for the group
of low regulated countries, is also very interesting. This implies that Nordic countries
manage to relatively achieve lower prices (see Table 5.2 for a summary) without a very
strong regulation, suggesting an interesting avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Country effects for selected models.
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note: The dashed line marks the US country effect’s level.
Table 1: Average differential of the country effect with respect to the US
Regulatory group All C 25P M 25P C+M 25P
Very high -1.63 -3.60 -1.58 -4.80
high -2.28 -3.29 -1.44 -3.14
Spain -1.69 -2.94 -1.37 -2.99
Low 0.48 -0.51 0.40 -0.41
Canada 0.08 -0.54 0.36 -0.44
Nordic countries -0.83 -1.37 -0.45 -1.06
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5.3 Pooled results by therapeutical class
In tables 10 and 11 we present the pooled sample results of the first and second stage
regressions by therapeutical class (one-digit ATC classes).15 We only present results when
the sample is not restricted in any dimension. As a rule, the analysis by therapeutical
class gives a very similar qualitative picture than the pooled analysis we have performed
in the previous section.
In the first stage regressions we obtain the following results.
1. The effect of the share of national product is in general non-significant with some
important exceptions: class C, for which it is negative, and classes L and M for
which it is positive.
2. We confirm that once we control for product effects, the effect of the degree of
concentration of national producers, the Berry index or firm size are not, as a rule,
significant.
3. We also find that new products from exclusively local producers get a small premium
for practically all therapeutical classes.
4. As found in previous studies the effect of the number of generics in the market is
ambiguous since it is positive for classes A, N and R and negative for classes J and
M.
5. The results of the country level variables (GDP per capita and Public consumption
to GDP ratio) are mostly in line with those reported in Table 8. The elasticity of
the price to the size of the public sector ranges from 1.4 (class C) to 3.0 (class H)
and the elasticity of the GDP per capita ranges from 0.62 (class H, non-significant)
to 2.5 (class A). The effect of the size of the public sector reduces significantly as we
move to more regulation. On the contrary, the effect of the GDP per capita either
does not vary with the level of regulation or it increases mildly.
The second stage results by therapeutical class clearly confirm that products from
exclusively local firms are, other things equal, cheaper than products from multinational
corporations. In contrast, we do not detect differences in any therapeutical class between
local and foreign multinationals. The results for the rest of the quality variables are, as a
rule, in accordance with expectations.
Results for country fixed effect are also in line with those we discussed in the previous
section. The estimated coefficients for very regulated countries are negative, which implies
15We have analyzed twelve classes: see variable definition for a list and a description of classes.
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that regulation, other things equal, reduces average prices for practically all the anatomical
therapeutical groups. What is more interesting is the fact that, for a large number of
groups, the US is not, other things equal, the country with highest prices. In fact,
average prices in Eastern (low regulated) European countries are, in a majority of groups,
higher. More importantly, in some groups average prices in the UK, the nordic countries,
Switzerland or, even Canada, are higher.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated empirically the determinants of prices for pharmaceu-
ticals. We have used a more extensive database than most previous studies, and we have
used a large number of controls and paid a close attention to the empirical strategy and
specification.
The sensibility of our results in other domains has allowed us to tackle the thorny
question of the determinants of regulation. We argued that an obvious footprint of rent-
seeking regulation would be the existence of lower prices in countries without significant
industrial presence. Our answer is robust, but contrary to conventional wisdom. In most
countries, their own multinationals command no price premium with respect to foreign
ones. Local, non-multinational firms tend to have lower prices than any multinational,
and whether these multinationals are foreign or local does not affect prices in a statistically
significant way.
Our results, thus, do not support the view that the outcome of regulation conforms
with the short-sighted best interest of local consumers. We do have evidence, on the other
hand, that quality matters for prices, that firms exercise considerable market power, and
that all multinational corporations obtain a price advantage. We have constructed a
theoretical model that accounts for all this findings simultaneously. The model is one of
an imperfectly competitive market. Demand is sensitive to quality, and firms, which can
be purely local, or multinational, have their prices regulated by a government who cares
only about the benefits of its voters. The explanation for the absence of a local price
premium is that multinationality confers a protection against government intervention.
Firms know that allowing prices to go too low in one country could lower prices in all
others, say because of the existence of reference prices. They may prefer, thus, to exit
completely one market rather than allowing it to spoil profits in all others. Knowing
this, and since the product has indeed a value for voters, the regulator will refrain from
driving too hard a bargain. Thus, there is a sense in which a reference price (or similar)
policy in one country becomes a “commitment device” to avoid lowering price in another
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one. Its effects are akin to the low-price guarantees that have been widely studied in the
industrial organization literature (Holt and Scheffman 1987, Arbatskaya, Hviid, Shaffer
2004) because of their anticompetitive implications.
Also, our results do not support the view that the U.S. has higher prices than the
rest of the countries in the sample. This confirms and extends prior work of Danzon
and Chao (2000b), and contradicts the assertions contained in the U.S. Department of
Commerce report (2004). An interesting avenue for further research is to explain how
some countries with low regulation (such as the Nordic countries) achieve significantly
lower average prices than others.
In this paper we have thus argued that pharmaceutical prices do not show signs of
being driven by pure rent-shifting motives from politicians. This does not mean that they
are set in a way that maximizes welfare. Indeed, these prices have to balance the provision
of long term incentives to innovation with the needs of present generations, something that
is particularly difficult given the decentralized way in which regulations occur throughout
the world. A necessary extension to the current work would be to ascertain empirically
the relationship between current prices and socially efficient ones. This would, of course,
require further theoretical work to determine a good benchmark (or a set of them) for
socially efficient prices.
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A Variable definition and descriptive statistics
A.1 Variable definition
Variable definition
Price Sales revenue divided by the number of standard units sold (in logs)
Natshare The market share of all national products in the ATC4 market
HHI-local The Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration index for national firms in the ATC4 market
fsales Firm sales in the country (in logs)
new A dummy taking one if the product was first observed in the previous year
Berry index The Berry index measure the degree of specialization of the corporation
Ngen Number of identified generics in the market
dum-GP n.a. Dummy of absence of a global price of reference
global price Average global price of the molecule in US real $
local A dummy taking one if the corporation is local-non multinational
localmulti A dummy taking one if the corporation is local but multinational
singlemol A dummy taking one if the product is not composite
lsummol Log of the number of market a molecule is present
generic A dummy taking one if the product is generic
Mshare Market share of the corporation the product belongs to in the ATC4 market
Fquota Average (in sample) firm quota of the firm in a given country
molage Time elapsed since the molecule was launched to December 31, 2003.
censormol A dummy taking one if the molecule was launched before January 1, 1991
censorlag A dummy taking one if the product was launched before January 1, 1991
fpc Fraction of public consumption in GDP (source: UN; in logs)
gdppcusd GDP per capita in 2000 US $ (source: UN, in logs)
REG Level of regulation: 1 low, 2 medium, 3 high.
THERAPEUTICAL CLASSES (one-digit ATC)
A ALIMENTARY TRACT AND METABOLISM
B BLOOD AND BLOOD FORMING ORGANS
C CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM
D DERMATOLOGICALS
G GENITO URINARY SYSTEM AND SEX HORMONES
H SYSTEMIC HORMONAL PREPARATIONS, EXCL. SEX HORMONES AND INSUL
J ANTIINFECTIVES FOR SYSTEMIC USE
L ANTINEOPLASTIC AND IMMUNOMODULATING AGENTS
M MUSCULO-SKELETAL SYSTEM
N NERVOUS SYSTEM
R RESPIRATORY SYSTEM
S SENSORY ORGANS 25
Table 2: Summary statistics by country
# of number of markets prod ATC4 Average prices GDP FPC REG
country corp ATC4 mol prod. /mol HHI (1) (2) (3) PC $
mean med
Argentina 250 273 1143 2892 2.5 .237 .158 14.7 1.92 1.20 7666 .137 3
Brazil 250 263 966 2711 2.8 .254 .140 2.66 .762 .362 3503 .190 3
Egypt 238 263 1038 1965 1.9 .293 .196 .287 .196 .081 1467 .097 3
Italy 215 234 669 1821 2.7 .286 .203 5.48 .293 .220 18680 .182 3
Austria 207 234 716 1311 1.8 .402 .302 14.2 .607 .510 23503 .192 2
Belgium 183 200 508 962 1.9 .396 .297 4.63 .207 .174 22271 .211 2
France 214 235 721 1800 2.5 .268 .195 3.17 .143 .125 22065 .232 2
Greece 205 223 604 1216 2.0 .401 .329 9.83 .956 .588 10281 .157 2
Japan 181 213 530 1800 3.4 .354 .247 19.5 .523 .752 37361 .164 2
Portugal 172 187 446 875 2.0 .379 .286 1.20 .113 .069 10629 .205 2
Spain 220 225 640 1620 2.5 .296 .212 4.00 .290 .200 13785 .175 2
Australia 160 172 438 909 2.1 .397 .305 8.28 .407 .316 20315 .179 1
Canada 213 236 812 2397 3.0 .246 .153 5.66 .244 .203 23198 .185 1
CzechRepublic 239 264 803 1406 1.7 .406 .332 4.50 .830 .322 5426 .220 1
Denmark 197 222 653 1890 2.9 .235 .152 24.1 .812 .823 29730 .252 1
Finland 154 184 459 695 1.5 .451 .367 12.7 .551 .508 23161 .206 1
Germany 261 289 1489 5831 3.9 .169 .097 7.83 .344 .300 22730 .189 1
Hungary 188 205 550 891 1.6 .411 .333 5.47 1.17 .430 4661 .096 1
Nether 146 172 404 1084 2.7 .393 .287 7.29 .312 .267 23314 .226 1
Norway 140 164 388 664 1.7 .437 .336 12.4 .314 .352 39484 .191 1
Poland 221 239 678 1259 1.8 .412 .314 6.89 1.60 .694 4307 .189 1
Sweden 176 204 590 1431 2.4 .306 .226 28.8 1.06 1.17 27050 .265 1
Switz 228 252 828 1336 1.6 .360 .279 9.67 .281 .339 34330 .111 1
UK 189 209 585 1054 1.8 .426 .342 6.97 .284 .282 24525 .186 1
US 264 302 1397 5785 4.1 .194 .115 16.0 .468 .470 34262 .143 1
Notes: The sample is restricted to products with positive consumption in the 1998-2003.
(1): Average prices; (2) Av of prices relative to per capita GDP (in 2000 US $); (3) Price average
relative to per capita GDP (in 2000 US $ but corrected for PPP). FPC: public consumption to
GDP ratio; REG: Regulatory level: a lower number indicates less regulation.
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Table 3: Distribution of the number of molecules of the corporations by country
country 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-20 21+ Total
Argentina 37 51 32 20 13 28 181
Australia 19 12 12 7 2 9 61
Austria 76 34 20 4 5 11 150
Belgium 19 32 21 7 2 8 89
Brazil 32 33 27 17 14 22 145
Canada 46 34 18 9 13 22 142
CzechRepublic 39 39 25 12 9 9 133
Denmark 37 25 16 8 5 13 104
Egypt 68 41 10 9 10 16 154
Finland 46 19 13 9 3 6 96
France 47 40 21 5 5 12 130
Germany 128 128 54 27 17 31 385
Greece 60 43 27 16 7 3 156
Hungary 26 29 14 8 4 7 88
Italy 59 73 37 18 5 9 201
Japan 28 40 41 16 8 5 138
Nether 17 26 14 7 1 13 78
Norway 36 20 14 7 5 5 87
Poland 57 37 24 11 10 6 145
Portugal 25 33 34 8 2 5 107
Spain 35 44 38 16 7 13 153
Sweden 44 38 15 9 6 12 124
Switz 57 40 23 9 6 8 143
UK 47 45 16 9 7 8 132
US 189 146 76 22 23 60 516
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Table 4: Distribution of molecule age by country
country 1 1-2 3-4 4-7 7-10 11+ Total
Argentina 23 110 185 393 308 124 1,14
Australia 13 75 82 145 99 24 438
Austria 11 109 126 251 145 74 716
Belgium 18 97 117 154 84 38 508
Brazil 32 146 179 296 202 111 966
Canada 15 102 101 229 285 80 812
CzechRepublic 20 107 105 259 198 114 803
Denmark 15 81 93 230 168 66 653
Egypt 51 213 205 278 227 64 1,038
Finland 10 71 68 166 105 39 459
France 23 86 123 268 137 84 721
Germany 29 227 172 369 411 281 1,489
Greece 14 133 97 192 103 65 604
Hungary 9 93 90 184 122 52 550
Italy 12 77 129 248 138 65 669
Japan 4 82 106 151 136 51 530
Nether 11 62 66 128 92 45 404
Norway 6 73 84 132 67 26 388
Poland 10 76 127 172 220 73 678
Portugal 14 77 80 139 89 47 446
Spain 19 104 110 215 124 68 640
Sweden 6 80 128 209 125 42 590
Switz 4 98 141 276 229 80 828
UK 16 87 98 201 127 56 585
US 13 171 205 391 360 257 1,397
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Table 5: Single country results (I): Argentina-Egypt. All products.
arg aus aut bel bra can cze den egy
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.099 -0.065 -0.005 0.005 0.042 0.045 -0.002 0.031 0.049
HHI-local -0.013 -0.007 -0.003 0.028* -0.049 0.004 -0.049* -0.012 0.038
fsales1 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 0.004 -0.015 -0.011 -0.006 -0.040** -0.012**
new1 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.024** 0.030* -0.009 0.033* 0.014 -0.004
new1*local 0.100 0.008 -0.001 0.103** -0.058 -0.018 -0.064 0.212* 0.006
new1*localm 0.013 0.003 -0.003 0.018* -0.008 0.002 -0.027 0.034 -0.005
Berry index 0.071** 0.097* -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 0.036 -0.042 -0.055 0.022
# generics 0.027 0.010 -0.013 -0.033 — 0.116** -0.014 -0.020 —
dum-GP n.a. -0.012** -0.012 -0.013** -0.009** -0.012** 0.004 0.002 -0.019** 0.005
global price 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.025* -0.007 -0.011 -0.019 0.028 -0.012
intercept 4.368** 3.997** 3.917** 3.602** 3.628** 3.181** 3.704** 4.303** 1.357**
Observations 8158 2534 3784 2839 7288 7296 3752 4868 6001
r2-w 0.894 0.290 0.288 0.341 0.761 0.051 0.195 0.177 0.913
r2-b 0.156 0.049 0.013 0.204 0.005 0.025 0.175 0.180 0.008
r2-o 0.138 0.021 0.003 0.105 0.021 0.005 0.082 0.129 0.035
F 729.78 275.59 128.28 98.25 569.13 12.26 120.07 179.83 1853.07
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local -0.454** -0.904** -1.045** -0.991** -0.580** -0.591** -0.825** -0.957** -1.089**
localmulti -0.330 -0.935* -1.149** -0.305 — -0.248 -0.040 -0.633** —
singlemol -0.010 -0.017 0.069 -0.062 0.007 0.382** 0.254 0.004 0.271*
lsummol 0.268** -0.039 0.621** 0.568** 0.343** 0.531** 0.272** 0.053 0.211**
generic 0.111 0.129 -0.483** -1.052** -0.364** 0.402** -0.419* -0.326 -0.078
intercept -0.972 2.389* 3.234** 2.591** 1.838** 11.147** 4.625** 3.486** 3.440**
Products 2180 768 1065 857 2342 2045 1027 1409 1759
r2 0.068 0.045 0.165 0.204 0.093 0.177 0.058 0.054 0.157
F 11.31 2.51 14.86 15.42 21.79 31.26 4.42 6.61 29.48
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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Table 6: Single country results (II): Finland-The Netherlands. All products
fin fra ger gre hun ita jap Net
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.072 -0.053 0.008 0.007 -0.175** 0.052 -0.037 0.016
HHI-local 0.006 -0.005 0.016 0.013 0.053 0.023 -0.008 0.010
fsales1 0.001 -0.008 -0.002 0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010*
new1 0.022 0.010 0.016** 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.003
new1*local 0.122 0.117 0.090* -0.048 -0.136 0.091 -0.050 0.068
new1*localm 0.027 0.016 0.024** -0.005 -0.028 0.013 0.010 0.010
Berry index -0.016 0.037 0.002 0.015 -0.033 0.060** 0.096 0.131
# generics — -0.002 0.004 -0.011 — 0.002 -0.012 -0.058*
dum-GP n.a. -0.009* -0.001 -0.003** 0.005 -0.031 -0.030** -0.041** -0.009*
global price 0.031 0.003 -0.003 0.047 0.006 -0.007 0.028* 0.015
intercept 4.146** 3.141** 3.300** 4.062** 3.645** 3.891** 4.117** 4.579**
Observations 1969 5798 17336 3741 2676 5759 5340 2615
r2-w 0.308 0.340 0.217 0.599 0.295 0.347 0.287 0.596
r2-b 0.353 0.313 0.313 0.000 0.088 0.013 0.048 0.042
r2-o 0.164 0.150 0.183 0.001 0.022 0.019 0.048 0.028
F 96.68 218.84 329.86 573.90 261.79 91.30 77.05 373.06
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local -0.261 -0.685** -0.046 -1.031** -0.377 -0.446** -1.038** -0.028
localmulti — -0.393** -0.113 -0.532 — -0.413* 0.011 0.291
singlemol -0.021 -0.145 0.246** 0.728** -0.090 0.684** -0.295 0.531**
lsummol -0.030 0.532** 0.548** 0.464** 0.592** 0.053 0.317** 0.182
generic -0.834** -0.908** -0.689** -0.282 -1.132** -0.388** -0.252 -0.407*
intercept -0.259 4.586** 6.958** 3.742** 4.650** 1.230 4.933** 3.964**
Products 530 1654 4956 1066 686 1680 1509 858
r2 0.050 0.200 0.157 0.136 0.113 0.046 0.103 0.048
F 2.49 29.33 65.88 11.83 7.80 5.73 12.23 3.01
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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Table 7: Single country results (III): Norway-US. All products
nor pol por spa swe swi uk us
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.077 -0.072 -0.004 0.054 0.062 0.008 0.033 0.047
HHI-local -0.056** 0.008 0.023* 0.037 0.015 0.012 0.023 0.048
fsales1 0.011 -0.000 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.010 -0.022**
new1 -0.016 0.028* 0.010 0.018* 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.085**
new1*local 0.016 0.117 -0.004 0.129* 0.104 0.000 0.072 0.204**
new1*localm -0.001 0.025 -0.009 0.023** 0.018 -0.001 0.005 0.041**
Berry index — -0.031 -0.011 -0.017 0.005 -0.035 -0.011 0.021
# generics -0.003 0.005 -0.029* -0.017 0.002 -0.023 -0.026 -0.041
dum-GP n.a. -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005** -0.015** -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
global price 0.006 -0.008 -0.017 0.003 0.037 -0.013 0.046** 0.007
intercept 4.623** 3.477** 3.801** 3.461** 4.574** 3.440** 4.172** 3.307**
Observations 1631 3643 2619 5074 3840 4410 3072 15474
r2-w 0.383 0.041 0.654 0.373 0.281 0.569 0.159 0.045
r2-b 0.000 0.428 0.014 0.127 0.149 0.010 0.031 0.243
r2-o 0.002 0.374 0.000 0.079 0.084 0.006 0.029 0.226
F 159.11 10.74 663.01 253.57 124.38 323.45 21.62 5.77
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local 0.683 -0.645** -0.009 -0.541** -0.901** -1.102** -1.012** -0.930**
localmulti 0.063 -0.839* 0.898* 0.100 -1.208** -0.173 -0.073 0.160
singlemol 0.386 -0.513** -0.124 0.280* 0.409* -0.086 0.439* 0.502**
lsummol -0.430 0.230* 0.548** 0.359** 0.040 0.612** 0.285** 0.176**
generic -1.147** -0.800** -0.545** -0.382** -0.437* -0.349* -0.999** -0.524**
intercept 6.322** 1.632 0.906 4.683** 5.537** 4.665** 3.958** 9.178**
Product 476 979 755 1475 1118 1159 867 4626
r2 0.106 0.079 0.095 0.105 0.060 0.179 0.139 0.179
F 3.89 5.87 5.57 12.19 5.92 17.85 9.83 71.80
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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